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INTRODUCTION 
Defendant-Appellant Vickie L. Holt ("WIFE") replies to Plaintiff-
Appellee Dale P. Holt's ("HUSBAND") Brief of Appellee filed in 
response to Wife's Brief of Appellant, and Husband's Brief on Cross-
Appeal as follows: 
1 
MATTERS CHALLENGED ON APPEAL & CROSS-APPEAL 
The financial matters challenged in Wife's appeal and Husband's 
cross-appeal are summarized as follows: 
1. Wife's appeal. Wife's appeal challenges the fairness of the 
Court's financial rulings, specifically with regard to the items 
specified in the footnote.1 
1
 Referring to § IV, K 7(a) - 7(m), pp. 8-11 of Wife's Brief, Wife challenges the Court's ruling in the 
following areas: 
(a) Alimony & child support amounts. The insufficiency of the alimony and child support; 
(b) Failure to award income producing assets to Wife. The giving of all income-producing property to 
Husband, including specifically the business building; 
(c) Refusal to permit Wife to share in Codale's goodwill and going concern value. Ruling that Codale's 
goodwill is not a marital asset and denying Wife the right to a share of Codale's goodwill and going concern value; 
(d) The Disproportionate division of assets. The disproportionate division of assets, including the value 
attributed to Codale; 
(e) Whether third-party sale discounts should be charged to Wife where there is no sale. Whether 
discounts should be applied to valuing Codale as if it were being sold to an independent third-party, which it is not; 
(f) Failure to minimize income tax consequences. Failure to distribute assets so as to minimize income 
taxes; 
(g) Imposing entire tax burden on Wife. Imposing all income tax liability which resulted from the Court's 
distribution of assets on the Wife; 
(h) Ordering wife to pay husband's income tax on asset distribution. Ordering Wife to indemnify 
Husband against income taxes which he may incur as a result of the Court's asset distribution; 
(i) Ordering wife to pay Husband's expert witness fees. Requiring Wife to pay Husbands expert witness 
fees; 
(j) Failure to order Husband to pay Wife's expert witness fees & attorney fees. Failure to require Husband 
to pay Wife's expert witness fee and attorney fees; 
(k) Requiring Wife to pay Codale for family vehicles. Requiring Wife to purchase family vehicles from 
Codale; 
(1) Failure to give Wife a compensating benefit for tax exemptions awarded to Husband. Awarding 
children's income tax exemptions to Husband with no compensating benefit to Wife, and; 
(m) Failure to give Wife a compensating benefit for condominium and country club membership 
awarded to Husband. Court's refusal to award Wife a compensating benefit for Husband's condominium and 
countiy-club membership which were not considered by the Court in the asset distribution. 
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2. Husband's cross-appeal. Husband's appeal challenges the 
$2,000 per month alimony to Wife, alleging Wife has sufficient assets 
and income, and therefor no need for alimony.2 Wife's response to 
Husband's cross-appeal is included in f 18-20, III.3 
3. Husband's reply to Wife's Brief. Husband's Brief4 asserts 
generally : 
(a) That Wife's share of Codale should be based on liquidation 
values. Because he could destroy Codale's goodwill and going concern 
value by opening a competing business which would appropriate most of 
Codale's major suppliers and customers, Husband asserts that Wife's 
share of Codale should be based on liquidation values; 
(b) That Codale's goodwill & going concern value are not marital 
assets. That because he could destroy its value, Codale's goodwill 
and going concern value are personal to him, and are not marital 
asset; 
(c) That Wife should pay entire $440,000 income tax liability 
incurred in divorce. That because he might sell his Codale stock, and 
may incur tax in connection with such a sale, all of the tax currently 
incurred in connection with his acquisition of Wife's share of Codale 
should be paid by Wife; 
(d) That Court's distribution should be affirmed because it was 
within the range of testimony. That said orders by the trial court 
should be affirmed as appropriate exercise of discretion by the trial 
court, since they are within the range of the evidence; 
(e) That Court's discretion permitted it to base alimony, child 
2
 See Points I & II, pages 8-10 of Husband's brief. 
3
 See pages 18-21 below. 
4
 See Summary of Argument, page 10-12 of Husband's Brief. 
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support on W-2 income, ignoring Husband's enormous Codale income. 
Husband alleges that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
basing alimony and child support on Husband's $80 Thousand W-2 income, 
even though this ignored the facts that: (1) Husband could increase 
his salary at will,5 (2) that a salary of about $250,000 was imputed 
by experts to Husband and was deducted by them from Codale's value,6 
and (3) ignored the fact that Codale (97.6% of which was owned by 
Husband) earned an average of $921,000 during the years 1991 through 
1994,7 earned over $1 Million in 19938 and would have earned about $1 
Million in 1994 but for its move to the new building9 in order to 
further expand its business; 
(f) That Court's rulings were not ^clearly erroneous." That 
the appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the 
trial court on factual issues unless they are clearly erroneous, which 
Husband alleges they were not; 
(g) That Court did not abuse its discretion requiring only ^ the 
interest rate Husband paid to commercial lenders. That a 4% interest 
rate on amounts due Wife was allegedly fair, even though Codale was 
paying 8% to 9% on money that it borrowed;10 
5
 T. 89. Husband testified that he could set his salary any place he wanted, within reason. 
6
 If the imputed salary is to be deducted in arriving at the value of Codale, then the same imputed salary 
should be used to fix the amount of alimony and child support. The Court erred in reducing Codale's value 
without giving Wife the corresponding benefit of increased alimony and child support. 
7
 Earnings for those five years would have been $800,000 higher if the appraiser had not imputed higher 
salaries to Husband (T. 133). After tax earnings for each of the 5 years from 1990 through 1994 were about $504.9 
Thousand. 
8
 In Woodward v. Woodward (Utah 1982) 656 P.2d 431 at 432 the Utah Supreme Court cited with 
approval a statement in Kikkert v. Kikkert (NJ 1981) 427 A.2d 76 at 78 that "the right to receive monies in the 
fiiture is unquestionably... an economic resource subject to equitable division in a dissolution proceeding." 
9
 T. 120. 
10
 T > 2 0 3 . 
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(h) That Alimony should be denied because Wife lacked economic 
need. That no alimony should be allowed, since assets awarded to Wife 
were allegedly sufficient to support herself in the standard enjoyed 
during the marriage; and 
(i) That Attorney fees and expert witness fees should be denied 
because Wife lacked economic need. That Wife was not entitled to be 
awarded attorney fees and expert witness fees because she allegedly 
has no economic need. 
£ 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Both briefs contain Statements of Fact, which are summarized as 
follows: 
1. Wife's Statement of Facts. Wife's Brief includes a 
statement of "Relevant Facts," including those listed in the 
footnote.11 
2. Response to Husband's Statement of Facts. Husband's 
"Statement of the Facts"12 contains several incorrect or misleading 
statements. Wife disagrees with many of those statements, and 
responds to some of the statements as follows: 
(a) Shields' fine-tuning of his valuation. Shields' testimony 
that Codale's value was $5.4 Million did not change. Husband's 
assertion in SI 8 that as the result of an error, after Shields 
reviewed Dorton's13 report he discovered a $500,000 valuation error, 
11
 As listed in 1 10, P. 12-16, relevant facts include: (a) that the parties are in their early forties, were 
married for over twenty-two (22) years, joint custody of children with Wife as primary custodian of the 10 and 14 
year old and Husband as primary custodian of the 16 year old; (b) identification of marital assets; (c) undervalua-
tion of Codale and depriving Wife of right to share in its goodwill and going concern values; (d) undervaluing 
Codale by discounting values as if being sold to a third-party; (e) incorrect computation re alleged award Vi of 
marital estate to Wife; (f) Court recognized need to equalize income of parties, but failed to do so. 
12
 11-13, P. 3-7. 
13
 David L. Dorton was Husband's valuation expert. 
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is incorrect and misleading.14 
(b) Shields' opinion re impact on value if Husband left Codale. 
Wife disagrees with Husband's claim that the value of Codale would be 
seriously impacted if Husband ceased to be employed by Codale, and if 
he did not compete. Although Shields' $5.4 Million valuation assumed 
Husband's continued association (T. 387, 409), if Husband left it 
would be appropriate to hire someone to replace him and to make a 
transition over a reasonable period of time (T. 393-394, 410) with 
only a minor effect on valuation.15 A transition to new management is 
vastly different from Husband appropriating Codale's suppliers and 
customers by Husband by establishing a competing business. 
(c) Shields' opinion re impact on value if Husband competed with 
Codale. Husband's brief {1 8) assumes that the effect on Codale would 
be similar whether Husband merely ceased to be employed by Codale, or 
if he opened a competitive business. Shields agreed that if Husband 
competed he could destroy Codale's goodwill and thereby significantly 
decrease its value. Shields also testified that Husband's ability to 
destroy goodwill did not mean that the goodwill did not exist (T. 387-
388) . 
(d) Shields' $3.3 Million book value. Shields testified that 
the book value of Codale was about $3.3 Million. Contrary to 
Husband's assertion that the amount realized from inventory would be 
below its $2.3 Million book value (1 8), because Codale's book value 
used the lower historical last-in, first-out valuation method 
14
 An earlier report Shields had valued Codale about $500,000 higher than his final $5.4 Million value. 
The change was a result of obtaining later financial data on comparable companies, as well as additional 
information from review of financial literature relative to discounts likely to apply to smaller companies, and was 
not from reviewing Dorton's report. [T. 33, L. 3-8 & T. 386]. 
15
 Contrary to Husband's assertion fl[ 8), Shields estimated the portion of Codale's goodwill as being 
attributed to Husband at 49% (T. 386-387). 
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("LIFO") ,16 Codale's inventory book value was undervalued $514,600,17 
and could probably be liquidated at or above book value (T. 19 & 399) . 
Husband's expert testified that even after a 15% deduction for 
liquidation loss, he still valued the inventory at $2.4 Million,18 
which was almost $100,000 more than book value.19 
(e) Dorton's $2.8 Million liquidation value. The Court 
adopted Dorton's $2.8 liquidation value, which is a net of $486 
Thousand20 less than book value.21 
(f) Shields does not agree with Dorton's salvage value 
conclusions. Shields' testimony is mis-characterized in St 10 of 
Husband's Brief. As discussed in 1 2(b) and 2(c) above, Husband could 
16
 IRS regulations permit a business to use the LIFO method to value inventory. Where (as here) 
merchandise prices have increased, Codale's use of the LIFO inventory method has resulted in lowering its taxable 
income and income taxes, and in reducing Codale's book value. 
17
 See 1 (3) of Ex. 9 to Husband's trial Ex. 21, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix P. Even 
after deducting 15% for possible shrinkage, Husband's expert's opinion was that after the LIFO adjustment, the 
inventory had a liquidation value of $417,700 more than its book value, as follows: 
(inJhousaMs) 
Inventory book value $2,270.0 
Add: LIFO adjustment 514.6 
Inventory value based on current costs 2,784.6 
Less: 15% est. loss on liquidation sale 417.7 
INVENTORY VALUE PER HUSBAND $2366.9 
18
 See Line 3 "Inventory", right column in Appendix P hereto. 
19
 Liquidation value of inventory per Husband $2,366.9 
Book value of inventory 2.270.0 
NET INVENTORY UNDERSTATEMENT $ 96.9 
20
 Unadjusted book value (Col. 1 on Ex. 9 to Appendix P hereto) $9,125.7 
Adjusted " " " 2 " " " " " ) 8.639.8 
DORTON'S BOOK VALUE WRITE DOWN $ 485.9 
21
 Dorton computed liquidation value as follows (Ex. 9 to Appendix P hereto): 
Book Value $3,2 93.7 
Net increase in inventory value (FN 19 above) 96.9 
Total adjusted book value 3,390.6 
Less: devalue accounts receivable $ 235.6 
write off intangible assets 347.2 
Total flgyaipatiQn of Hwok vaiw — 5 8 1 8 
Dorton's liquidation value $2,807.5 
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be replaced with other employees with minimal damage to Codale,22 but 
that Codale's value could be seriously damaged if Husband were to 
compete with Codale. Shields testified he believed Husband's threat 
to destroy Codale by competing was not genuine, that Codale would 
likely continue to operate as before, and that devaluation based upon 
speculation that Husband could harm Codale was not appropriate.23 
(g) Offer to purchase Codale for $3.4 Million. The alleged 
offer to purchase Codale for $3.3 Million if Husband left, or for $3.4 
Million if he stayed with Codale (1 11 of Husband's Brief, trial Ex. 
14 & T. 74), has little probative value because it was a preliminary 
negotiation, was subject to many contingencies,24 and Husband was not 
interested in that price as shown by his failure to follow up with 
negotiations.25 However, that offer is significant in that the 
prospective buyer valued Husband's personal goodwill at only 
$300,000.26 Dorton valued Codale's goodwill at $1 Million. Therefore 
Codale's business goodwill (without Husband) is $700,000. Wife is 
entitled to H or to an additional $350,000 using Dorton's valuation, 
or to an additional $1.1 Million based upon Wife's expert's goodwill 
valuation of $2.6 Million.27 
(h) Unnecessary income taxes resulted from Court's asset 
division. Under IRS § 1041, transfer of assets between spouses or 
22
 T. 34. 
23
 T. 409-411. 
24
 See trial Ex. 14 and T. 74-75. 
25
 Evidence of the purchase offer was received over Wife's objections. (T. 74 & 629). 
26
 $3.4 Million minus $3.1 Million = $300,000. 
27
 See discussion in U 15(e), page 29 of Wife's Brief. 
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former spouses incident to a divorce is not taxable.28 Instead of 
dividing the marital estate as a tax-free transfer under § 1041, or 
at least awarding the business building to Wife at a $410,000 tax 
savings, the Court ordered redemption of Wife's Codale stock, 
triggering a $440,000 taxable event (5 12 of Husband's Brief). The 
Court imposed the entire $440,000 of the resulting income tax burden 
upon Wife.29 The tax consequence could have been reduced to only 
$30,000 had the court merely awarded the business building to Wife.30 
The Court erred in not selecting an asset distribution method which 
would minimize resulting income taxes. 
(i) Court should disregard Husband's speculative argument that 
he might incur taxes if in the future he sold Codale. Husband argues 
that since he might someday sell his Codale stock, that Wife should 
pay all of the income tax incurred now in connection with the Court-
ordered redemption of her stock (5 12 of Husband's Brief). Shields 
testified that Husband can transfer Codale to his children without 
incurring income tax by simple estate planning, and that is unlikely 
he will ever incur income tax as a result of his receipt of the Codale 
stock.31 In similar circumstances, in Howell32 this Court approved the 
trial court's refusal to speculate about hypothetical future tax 
consequences from a property division made pursuant to a divorce 
28
 T. 313. 
29
 See discussion in K 15(i), P. 33-34 of Wife's Brief. 
30
 See discussion in Wife's Brief K 15(i), page 33-34; f7(f) & footnote 39, page 9; ^ 10(e) & footnote 77, 
page 15; Robert Hunter's ("HUNTER") summary in Appendix I thereto; and % 16, footnote 147, page 36 and 
Hunter's testimony (T. 313). 
31
 See Hunter's testimony (T. 314). It is speculative and uncertain whether Husband will ever incur 
income tax on his Codale stock, and if so, when and in what amount. Also set Alexander v. Alexander (Utah 
1987) where the Utah Supreme Court refused to reduce the present value of a profit sharing plan by hypothetical 
future tax consequences. 
32
 Howell v. Howell (Utah App. 1991) 806 P.2d 1209 at 1213-14. 
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decree. However, there is no speculation about the $430,000 of 
capital gains taxes which must be paid by Wife as a result of the 
Court ordered redemption of her Codale Stock.33 The Court erred in 
imposing the entire tax burden on Wife. 
U 
HUSBAND'S ARGUMENT 
3. Court denied Husband's Motion to Strike reference in Wife's 
Brief to URCP 59 Motion. Husband's Motion to Strike references in 
Wife's Brief to her post-trial URCP 59 Motion34 is attached to his 
Brief as Ex. #10. A copy of Wife's response thereto is attached 
hereto as Appendix #Q, Husband's reply is attached hereto as Appendix 
R; and a copy of this Court's Order denying that motion is attached 
hereto as Appendix S. Since that issue has been resolved, no further 
argument thereon will be made herein. 
X 
4. Wife's Brief Marshaled the Evidence. Without pointing out any 
specific deficiency in the Marshaling of Evidence section of Wife's 
Brief, Husband alleges generally that Wife's Brief fails to meet the 
"Marshaling of Evidence" requirement by "examine(ing) the evidence 
presented at trial by Husband" and alleges it "fails to demonstrate 
the trial Court's error." To the contrary, Wife has carefully 
Marshaled the evidence adduced by Husband, and has shown that the 
Court's rulings are against the clear weight of the evidence and are 
clearly erroneous.35 
33
 See discussion in <f 2(h) above and in footnote 30 above. 
34
 Husband's Motion to Strike is discussed on page 12 of Husband's Brief. 
35
 See page 13. Wife's Brief P.20-24 "Marshaling of Evidence" & Footnote 83, page 20 also shows that 
"Other portions of the brief also Marshall and discuss the evidence adduced in support of the Court's Findings." 
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II 
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
& 
Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness 
5. Fair and equitable overall results are required. Most of 
Husband's Brief is devoted to his argument that the property 
distribution, alimony and child support should be affirmed because 
they are allegedly within the trial court's broad discretion, are not 
"clearly erroneous/' the "value is within the ranges established by 
expert testimony", that the marital assets were distributed in a "fair 
and equitable" manner,36 and that Wife's appeal is allegedly an 
improper request that the appellate court redetermine a disputed 
factual issue.37 While the trial judge has broad discretion with 
respect to issues of fact, it must "exercises its discretion in 
accordance with the standards set by this court",38 its decision will 
be reversed if it "abuses its discretion," if the decision is "clearly 
erroneous",39 if it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if 
the appellate court "reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made."40 The bottom line is that to pass muster the 
decision must be fair and there must be an overall equitable result.41 
36
 K 8, page 24 of Husband's Brief. 
37
 Husband's Brief pages 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 & 34. 
38
 Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1987). 
39
 URCP 52(a). A finding is clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight of the evidence, or if the 
court is otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 
193 (Utah 1987) 
40
 State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Weston 
v. Weston, 11Z P.2d 408 (Utah App. 1989). 
41
 There is an unavoidable and intricate connection between property division and alimony. To adjust one 
may necessitate the adjustment of another. Burt v. Burt ,799 P.2d. 1166 at 1172, footnote 10 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990); A clear abuse of discretion is shown where such a serious inequity has resulted. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 at 
Appellant's (Wife) Reply Brief- Holt v. Holt -10 
Wife has appealed because, as demonstrated in her opening Brief, the 
property distribution, alimony and child support were grossly unfair 
and the overall result was not equitable.42 It would be difficult to 
imagine a case where the overall result was so highly inequitable. 
Husband's conclusionary argument that the court "fairly and equitably 
divides(ed) the marital estate" is a gross distortion.43 
6. Few disputed facts. Wife gave Husband the benefit of the 
doubt by using Husband's expert's testimony to support the facts 
stated in her appeal.44 Wife's challenge is to the trial court's 
failure to properly apply the facts, which resulted in erroneous 
conclusions of law by the trial court and in disproportionate,45 
unfair, inequitable46 asset and income distribution. 
7. Correction-of-error standard applies to the Court' conclusions 
of law. Where as here, the pivotal questions are questions of law, 
the court of appeals applies a correction-of-error standard with no 
particular deference to the trial court's construction.47 Most if not 
all of the pivotal issues involved this appeal are issues of law. For 
example each of the following decisions by the trial court is a 
424; Martinez v. Martinez. 754 P.2d 69 at 76. Findings of value are necessary to permit the appellate court to 
determine "whether the trial court distributed the property equitably." Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050 (Utah App. 
1987) citing Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Utah 1985). 
42
 See 111, page 17-19; K 13-24, pages 25-48 of Wife's opening Brief herein. 
43
 P. 14-15. 
44
 110, pages 12-16; K 11, pages 17-19; \ 12,13, 14, 15 & 16, pages 20-40 of Wife's opening Brief. 
45
 Ebbertv. Ebbert, 744P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah App. 1987) 
46
 Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P.2d 235 (Utah 1977) [disposition of property should be fair, equitable and 
necessary for the welfare of the parties]; Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980); Newmeyer v. 
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 at 1278. For example the court may even average conflicting values so long as it arrives 
at an "equitable solution." 
47
 T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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conclusion of law based upon undisputed facts:48 (a) the trial court's 
conclusion that Codale's had no business goodwill or going concern 
value because Husband threatened to mis-appropriate Codale's 
suppliers, customers, key employees, etc. by opening a competitive 
business; (b) the trial court's determination that Codale's goodwill 
was not a marital asset, and the resulting valuation of Codale at 
asset salvage value instead of going concern value - which resulted 
in valuing some assets at very low values, such as $341,300 of 
intangible assets at zero;49 (c) the trial court's decision to ignore 
Codale's enormous income,50 and to base alimony and child support on 
Husband's modest discretionary $80,00051 salary, even though his own 
expert testified that he valued Husband's services at about $250,000 
in valuing Codale; (d) the trial court having adopted a distribution 
method which unnecessarily triggered a $440,000 tax liability; (e) 
the Court's requiring wife to pay the entire $440,000 tax based upon 
speculation that Husband might at some time in the future incur some 
income tax if he sold Codale; (f) refusal to award the business 
building to Wife and award of all income-producing assets to husband; 
(g) required Wife to pay husband's expert witness fees, and refused 
her request for attorney fees and expert witnesses fees; (h) refusal 
to give Wife a compensating asset award to offset value of the 
condominium, country club membership, income tax exemptions and other 
assets awarded to Husband without a compensating benefit to Wife; and 
48
 See 17, pages 8-11; K 10, pages 16; K 11, pages 17-20; U 13-24, pages 25-47 of Wife's Brief 
49
 See Ex. 9 to plaintiffs trial Ex. 21, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix P. A related issue 
is whether the value of Codale should be discounted 40% as if it were being sold to an independent third-party, or 
whether it should have been valued at investment value since Codale was not being sold. 
50
 See discussion in 115(c), page 28; «f 16(d) & 16(e), pages 38-40; f 17(b), pages 42-44 of Wife's 
opening Brief herein. 
51
 The fact that Husband can increase his salary is illustrated by his 1990 salary increase $340,000 and to 
$309,000 in 1992, with which he purchased land. See discussion on 1 27 of Husband's Brief herein. 
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(i) requiring Wife to pay Codale the market value of family vehicles; 
etc. Since each of said decisions by the trial court constitute 
conclusions of law based upon undisputed facts, they should be 
reviewed by the Court of appeals for correctness, giving little 
deference to the trial court's conclusions. The asset and income 
distribution was unfair and inequitable, should be vacated, and Wife 
should be awarded a fair share of the marital assets and income. 
B 
Abuse of discretion standard 
8. Definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 
To the extent that said decision by the trial court may constitute an 
exercise of discretion, said findings are without evidentiary 
foundation because they were induced by the trial court's erroneous 
view of the applicable law.52 See discussion in Wife's Brief herein.53 
£ 
Assets were unfairly divided 
9. Assets were not evenly divided. Although the trial court 
stated that it was giving each party ^  of what it determined to be the 
salvage value of the marital assets, the net assets distributed to 
Wife was substantially less than the assets distributed to Husband.54 
Husband's computation [P. 14], which purports to demonstrate that each 
received ^  of the assets, shows that Wife received only about 36% of 
the assets, or about $1,368,000 less than Husband. The purported 
52
 Western Capital & Sees., Inc. v. Knudavig, 768 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct. App.), Cert, denied 779 P.2d 688 
(Utah 1989). 
53
 If 11, pages 17-19; 113-24, pages 25-47 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
54
 See 1J15(jX page 34 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. Primarily as a result of the Court requiring Wife to 
pay all of the income tax incurred under its asset distribution order, the net value of assets distributed to Husband 
was $1,740,729 and the net value of assets distributed to Wife was $1,304,848, a shortage of $435,881. Also see 
balance sheets and bar chart which compares parties assets after divorce. (Appendix B, R. 485). 
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value of the Codale stock is $1,374,151 (which was conveniently 
omitted from the computation) .55 If we substitute in the computation 
the $2,732,000 value of the Codale stock as found by the Court, and 
deduct the $430,000 of income tax imposed on Wife by the Court, then 
Husband's computation shows that he received about $1,798,00056 more 
in assets than Wife. Not only did the Court substantially undervalue 
the marital assets, its error was compounded by not giving Wife ^ of 
even that reduced value as the Court said it was doing. The overall 
result was unfair and should be corrected. 
10. Value of Codale stock. Codale is the major marital asset. 
The parties lived modestly, plowed their earnings back into the 
business, and were very successful in accumulating a business with a 
net worth of over $3.3 Million, an appraised value of from $3.8 
Million to $5.4 million, even after reducing the value by about 40% 
as if the business were being sold to a third-party.57 Codale earned 
over $1 Million after taxes in 1993 and Husband's expert 
conservatively projected that Codale will have over $1258 Million 
dollars in after-tax earnings in the 10 years from 1995 through 2004, 
even if anticipated additional income is not realized as a result of 
the move to its new building, built to permit expansion and even 
55
 The Court valued the Codale stock at $2,732,000 [Finding 15, Ex. 5, R. 360], but Husband's 
computation [Page 14 of Husband's Brief] only charges Husband $1,364,151 for that stock, an undercharges of 
$1,367,849 [$2,732,000 - $1,364,151 = $1,367,849]. 
56
 Codale stock to husband $2,732,000 
Other assets to husband 376.488 
Total assets to husband 3,108,488 
Assets to wife (per Husband's computation) L740.639 
Excess assets to Husband 1,367,849 
Add: Income tax imposed on wife 430.000 
TOTAL EXCESS ASSETS TO HUSBAND $1.797.849 
57
 See 115(d), page 29 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
58
 See Appendix "O" to Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
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higher earnings.59 The Court erred by giving husband 100% of Codale 
and its new building, with its valuable assets and enormous earning 
capacity, while giving Wife only a fraction of the asset salvage value 
and none of its unusually large earning capacity. Husband's argument 
[P. 17] that Wife's appeal is "nothing more than a request that the 
Court of Appeals re-determine a factual issue heard by the trial 
Court" is without merit. 
11. Codale's goodwill. Husband's expert valued Codale's goodwill 
at $1 Million, but valued the goodwill at zero because Husband 
threatened to loot Codale's suppliers, customers and key employees by 
organizing a competitive business. Wife's expert valued Codale's 
goodwill at $2.8 Million, a difference of $1.6 Million.50 Husband 
properly defines goodwill [P. 19], and cites Jackson and Stevens [P. 
19] for the proposition that a business lias no goodwill if its 
existence would vanish were the individual who conducts the enterprise 
to die, retire or quit work. Based upon that definition, Codale has 
goodwill since, if Husband were to die, retire or quit, others could 
be hired to take his place, and Codale's 100+ other employees could 
continue to perform their functions. Like Gardner, where the court 
found that the goodwill of the Ogden clinic, which employed 23 
physicians, did not rest on the reputation of any one person as it 
does in the case of a sole practitioner,61 the goodwill of Codale with 
its 100+ employees does not rest on Husband. Possible destruction of 
Codale's goodwill by Husband's threatened misconduct does not mean 
that Codale does not possess goodwill, or that Wife is not entitled 
to her share of that goodwill. The goodwill value of a business is 
59
 See 115(c), page 28; and f 17(b), page 42 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
60
 See H15(e), page 29-30 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
61
 Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). 
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subject to equitable d i s t r ibu t ion . 6 2 The Court erred in not giving 
Wife a compensating benefi t when i t awarded Codale's goodwill to 
Husband. 
12. Payout to Wife was an abuse of discretion. Husband's 
argument begs the question. His argument i s , in effect , tha t since 
the t r i a l court has "broad l a t i tude" to "fashion a var ie ty of methods 
for dividing a s s e t s , " and that j o in t ownership of a business by 
divorced p a r t i e s i s undesirable because i t may foster future 
con f l i c t s , the asset d i s t r i bu t ion plan selected by the t r i a l court 
somehow must be "in accordance with the standards set by t h i s cour t . " 
The facts are not in d ispute . The rules are c l ea r . The t r i a l ' s 
Cour t ' s incorrec t appl icat ion of those ru les to those facts i s "not 
in accordance with the standards set by the appellate court and should 
be vacated and remanded with i n s t r u c t i o n s . " As discussed above and 
in Wife's Opening Brief, i t i s clear that the decision i s against the 
c lear weight of the evidence, and tha t a mistake has been made which 
should be corrected.6 3 
13. Family automobiles. One of the major reasons the monthly 
family expenses were so modest was because of the cost of owning and 
operating family automobiles, as well as many other perks, were paid 
for by Codale. For income tax reasons, t i t l e to the family 
automobiles was in Codale. I t was an abuse of d i sc re t ion to not only 
cut off those perks, but to at the same time require Wife to purchase 
the family automobiles for ful l market value from Codale.64 See 
62
 Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1080, n. 1 (Utah 1988). 
63
 State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988). 
64
 Since tax laws permit rapid depreciation of automobiles, the book value was probably substantially less 
than the amount Wife was required to pay. Where, as here, the corporation is almost wholly owned by the parties, 
the corporate form should be disregarded and the true fact enforce, that the automobiles were family automobiles 
which should be have been distributed as separate assets in the divorce. 
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discussion re automobiles in Wife's Opening Brief.65 
14. Wife should receive a compensating benefit for omitted 
assets. Husband incorrectly argues that the condominium, secretly 
owned by Husband, was not a marital asset, and that it was allegedly 
purchased after the divorce.66 After filing Husband's Brief herein, 
counsel for Husband advised counsel for Wife that they had erred, and 
that the condominium was actually owned at the time of the marriage. 
The Oakridge Country Club Membership was omitted in valuing the 
assets.67 A compensating benefit should be given to Wife to offset 
those omitted marital assets. 
15. No interest, then 4% interest rate was abuse of discretion. 
The trial court made no finding to justify requiring Wife to loan 
Husband, interest-free for 10 months, followed by a 4% two year loan, 
when Husband was paying 8% on business loans. This is not a 
financially difficult case which necessitates a $25,000 reduction in 
interest. Remand is required to make findings.68 
16. Husband should be required to pay for intangible assets he 
received. Husband does not dispute that he received Codale's $347,200 
of "intangible assets," or that Wife's *s share of those assets is 
$173,6700. Instead, Husband again hides behind the abuse of discretion 
argument discussed above. Wife should be paid her H or $174, 000.6'* 
17. Disproportionate asset division. In Carr, the Idaho Court 
65
 See If 7(k), page 10; H 10(b)(5) & FN 68, page 14; and H15(m), page 35 of Wife's Opening Brief. 
66
 See discussion in «| 7(m), page 11; 1110(b)(6) & FN 70, page 14 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
67
 f 1(a), page 2 & FN 7, page 2 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
68
 See 11(e) & FN 12, P. 3 of Wife's Opening Brief. Remand to make findings is appropriate. Haumont 
v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
69
 See discussion in K 15(1), page 35 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
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of Appeals resolved a similar threat by a husband to open a competing 
truck stop by affirming an order which required that the business be 
sold, required the husband to execute a reasonable non-competition 
agreement, and on remand directed the trial court to'consider awarding 
husband a larger share of the marital assets to compensate for the 
limitations imposed by the non-competition agreement.70 In Dunn/1 the 
Utah Court of Appeals approved a 7 6% - 24% property division in a 
second marriage where (unlike our case) the wife had done little to 
contribute toward her husband's success as an orthopedic surgeon. On 
remand, the Court should consider directing the trial court to 
apportion a greater part of the business goodwill and going concern 
to Husband in exchange for a revised valuation based upon his 
execution of a reasonable non-compete agreement. 
Ill 
COMPENSATING ADJUSTMENT THROUGH ALIMONY 
18. Wife is not about to become a public charge. The essence 
of Husband's cross-appeal, and response to Wife's alimony and child 
support appeal, is his argument that no alimony should be paid because 
Wife has sufficient financial resources to maintain the very frugal 
lifestyle,72 and to not become a public charge.73 Husband's argument 
misses the point. Even though most of the family income was plowed 
back into Codale for working capital and expansion to increase its 
earnings, Codale's $1 Million-plus earning capacity is the major 
70
 Carr v. Carr, 701 P.2d 304 (Idaho App. 1985). A copy of Carr is attached hereto as Appendix "T". 
71
 Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
72
 Husband's argument that the family lived on from $3,800 to $4,200 per month [P.8-10, 26,-29] 
ignores the automobiles, family expenses and perks paid by Codale. [See |11(a), P. 17 of Wife's Brief]. 
73
 Husband's Cross-Appeal pages 5, 8-10; and Husband's reply to Wife's Brief, pages, 5,12 & 24-32. 
Appellant's (Wife) Reply Brief - Holt v. Holt -18 
marital asset.74 Wife does not claim poverty, but does ask for a fair 
share of that income as non-terminable alimony and reasonable child 
support.75 
19. Conclusion that alimony & child support should be based on 
Husband's $80,000 discretionary income is not supported by the 
evidence. The trial court's conclusion that alimony and child support 
should be based upon Husband's modest $80,000 salary, without 
considering the $250,000 value of Husband's services, Codale's $1 
Million dollar per year income capacity, and Holt Property's income, 
is not supported by the evidence, fails to meet the fairness test and 
is an abuse of discretion.76 In view of Codale's huge earnings and 
available cash, Husband could have substantially increased his salary. 
The trial court's conclusion that Alimony and child support should be 
based upon Husband's $80,000 discretionary salary instead of being 
based on the overall marital income, is not supported by the findings 
of fact,77 or by the evidence, and is an abuse of discretion. The 
same $250,000 Husband's income should be used for alimony and child 
support as was used by Husband's expert to value Codale.78 The trial 
court's conclusion should be reviewed by the Court of Appeals on a 
correction-of-error standard, without any special deference to the 
74
 The right to receive monies in the future is unquestionably...an economic resources subject to equitable 
distribution based upon proper computation of its present dollar value. Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 
(Utah 1982), citing Kikkert v. Kikkert, 427 A.2d 76, 78 (New Jersey 1981) [involved pension rights]. 
75
 See H7(a), P. 8; K 10(f), P. 16; Ull(d), P. 18; 112, P. 24; 1 15(a), P. 27; f 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 & 
22, P. 36-46 of Wife's Opening Brief. 
76
 See discussion in 1(16, 17 and 18, pages 36-46 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
77
 Without specific findings the appellate court is unable to determine whether the trial court distributed 
property (or income) equitably. Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050 (Utah App. 1987), citing Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072, 1074 (Utah 1985). 
78
 See discussion in ^ 21, page 45 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
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trial court.79 Husband's argument [P. 30] that Wife didn't make an 
"underemployment" argument to the trial court is without merit. 
Wife's argument that husband could raise his salary at-will is a 
classic "underemployment" argument. 
20. If Husband's expertise is akin to an advanced degree, he 
must assume burdens. The trial court accepted Husband novel (and 
unreasonable) argument that Codale's goodwill, which results from its 
huge earning capacity, is personal to Husband, that it was not a 
marital asset subject to distribution, and gave Codale's business, 
goodwill and going concern to Husband, without a compensating benefit 
to Wife. Husband now argues that the Court's decision is akin to a 
finding that Codale's unusually large earning ability is akin to an 
advanced decree,80 and that, like an advanced degree, it is not 
marital property subject to division between the parties. If for 
purposes of argument we assume Husband's argument is correct, then 
under Utah cases, and the trial court's finding that Wife's efforts 
contributed to the value of Codale, the court should have "made a 
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding 
alimony."81 The trial court did neither. In Martinez, supra at 542 
the Utah Supreme Court ruled that a spouse is entitled to a 
"compensating adjustment" in alimony where earning capacity of the 
other spouse has been greatly enhanced through their collective 
79
 Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987); 
T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Bailey v. Call, 161 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct. App.), Cert Den. 773 
P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
80
 It should be kept in mind that Codale has 100+ employees who sell electrical equipment. To argue that 
Husband's services to Codale are the sole source of its earning capacity is unreasonable. Without Husband Codale 
would continue to operate through its other employees. Husband's threat to destroy Codale by looting its suppliers, 
customers and key employees by forming a competitive company does not somehow make Codale's earning 
capacity asking to husband possessing a professional degree. 
81
 Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1991). Also see discussion in f 16(b) & (c), P. 37-38 
of Wife's Opening Memorandum. 
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efforts: 
In some circumstances, it may be appropriate to try to 
equalize the spouses' respective standards of living 
(citations omitted) . When a marriage of long duration 
dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the 
income of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both that change, unless unrelated to the 
efforts put forward by the spouses during the 
marriage, should be given some weight in fashioning 
the support award (citations omitted). This, if one 
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced 
through the efforts of both spouses during the 
marriage, it may be appropriate for the trial court to 
make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital 
property and awarding alimony. (Emphasis added). 
Cases cited by Husband hold that Wife's investment in husband and 
disparity in income due to a professional license should be reflected 
and addressed by a greater property settlement and higher alimony.82 
If husband's earning capacity is akin to a degree, he then, like a 
professional, must also assume the duty of paying higher alimony 
because of the disparity in income. 
21. The alimony should be non-terminable. Where, as here, 
alimony is used to make a "compensating adjustment" for Codale's huge 
income, the alimony should be permanent, and it should not be affected 
by Wife's marital status. Husband's argument that UC 30-3-5(8) should 
be ignored because it was effective until shortly after entry of the 
divorce decree is without merit, because that statute merely codified 
existing case law,83 including Martinez, quoted in 1 18 above. The 
reason alimony terminates upon remarriage, co-habitation, etc., is 
because someone else is receiving the benefit of wife's services, has 
82
 Cases cited on page 33 Husband's Brief hold that wife is entitled to higher alimony because of wife's 
investment in Husband and to address the disparity in income due to a professional license. See Gardner v. 
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988) and Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987). 
83
 See discussion in H 16(f), page 40 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. 
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assumed the role of husband, has assumed the duty of support, and 
therefore the ex-husband should no longer be required to support her. 
The Court has authority to carve out an exception where, as here, the 
purpose of alimony is to permit wife to share in earning capacity of 
husband through enhanced alimony amounts- Under those circumstances 
it would make little sense to terminate Wife's alimony simply because 
she remarries. Husband should not be entitled to receive a windfall, 
and to appropriate to himself all the enormous Codale income acquired 
during the marriage, merely because his former wife remarries. Public 
policy encourages remarriage. No public policy or purpose is advanced 
by requiring Wife to remain celibate. It ought to be kept in mind the 
purpose behind the rule, and should not apply it in circumstances 
which do not accomplish that purpose. As is true with a professional 
degree, since Husband acquired the enhanced earning capacity during 
marriage, Wife and children are entitled to share in that enhanced 
income through higher than usual alimony and child support. 
IY 
ATTORNEY FEES 
22. Wife has a "need" for attorney & witness fees. Utah ,Code 
30-3-3, which allows the award of attorney fees in divorce cases, 
states in part: 
". . .the court may order a party to pay the 
costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including 
expert witness fees, of the other party to enable 
the other party to prosecute or defend the 
action. (Emphasis added). 
"Need" is not limited to poverty situations, but should consider 
Wife's financial circumstances, and the comparative "needs" of both 
parties. Husband sued, and she had a "need" to defend. Substantially 
all of the financial information was readily available to Husband 
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through his accountants, while Wife was required to employ attorneys, 
accountants and business appraisal experts, at great expense, to 
fulfill her "need" to defend, and her efforts to obtain a fair share 
of the marital assets and income.84 Husband's concealment of assets, 
such as the condominium, his refusal to share the goodwill and going 
concern value of the family business or its unusually large income, 
have substantially increased the difficulty and expense incurred in 
defending Husband's lawsuit. In like circumstances, in Morgan, supra, 
the court affirmed the award of attorney fees to a wife, even though 
she had been awarded substantial assets: 
Because the income to [wife] from the Bel-Aire 
[Apartments] is uncertain and because [wife] has 
no other source of income and because [husband] 
has received a larger portion of the marital 
estate than [wife], the court finds that [wife] 
is without reasonable ability to pay her own 
legal fees and that [husband] does have such 
ability and finds that [husband] should pay to 
[wife] the sum of $67,567.35 toward her attorney 
fees incurred in this action. 
The Court abused its discretion by requiring Wife to further 
deplete her modest share of the marital assets by refusing to require 
Husband to pay her attorney fees, expert witnesses fees, as well as 
Husband's expert witness fees, particularly in view of the depletion 
that resulted from requiring wife to pay $440,000 of marital income 
taxes imposed as a result of the Court's asset distribution order. 
Y 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should grant a new trial, and/or should reverse and 
remand with instructions as requested in Wife's Brief, including 
84
 Under like circumstances, in Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559 (Utah App. 1993) the court approved 
the award of $67,500 of attorney fees where she incurred substantial expense in obtaining financial information 
which was in the possession of husband, even though she was awarded substantial assets in the divorce. 
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instructions to award Wife H of Codale's marital going concern value, 
including goodwill/ without reductions for size, marketability, 
awarding reasonable alimony, child support, etc., including the relief 
requested in Wife's February, 1996 Brief. 
Dated August 21, 1996 ./fj 
Ronald C * Earker , cu-counsel for Wife, 
Vickie Holt 
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